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ABSTRACT 
This paper commends Lindahl for his expansive and fluid conception of the defining and 
therefore delimiting  terms of  legal jurisdiction, as encompassing not only spatial, but al-
so temporal, material and subjective criteria. It proceeds to challenge Lindahl to develop 
his philosophical insight in such a way thst allows for the intensified porosity of the con-
temporary  postnational  or ‘globalising’ legal condition of late modernity to be adequate-
ly distinguished from the State-centred  Westphalian condition of high modernity. 
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Introduction 
Hans Lindahl presents us with such a rich, challenging and multi-faced con-
tribution to contemporary legal theory in his formidably argued and beauti-
fully presented  Fault Lines of Globalization (FLG) that a review much fuller 
than my own short comment would struggle to do it justice.  The true meas-
ure of the book will lie not in its early responses – affirmative though they 
promise to be – but in how it infiltrates the word of legal theory in the longer 
run, adjusting how we think about the subject in its broadest terms and in its 
deepest premises. For, make no mistake, this is a path-breaking study. It of-
fers a fresh lens through which to ask questions both about the general part 
of legal theory – the examination of the basic structure of law and of legal or-
der – and about its perhaps most topical special part - the changing nature of 
law under conditions of globalisation. But just how fresh is FLG’s fresh lens, 
and where do existing perspectives stand once that fresh perspective is intro-
duced?  
Let me confine my brief remarks to that very question, as directed at 
Lindahl’s contribution both to general legal theory and to the study of law 
and globalisation. The aim in each case is to tease out from a presentational 
style that, for all its considerable eloquence, remains admirably light on self-
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presentation, the extent to which FLG offers something novel, and to exam-
ine some of the implications of that novelty for future lines of research. 
 
 
1. Lindahl’s fundamental aim is to develop a first person plural conception of 
legal order. In so doing he draws upon insights from analytical theories of col-
lective action, but also, and of greater epistemological centrality to his pro-
ject, from phenomenology - in particular, as he puts it, “a phenomenology of 
the alien or strange” (4). To use a Kantian distinction, the basic commitment 
Lindahl brings from phenomenology is an attention to phenomena (i.e. objects 
as interpreted by human sensibility and understanding) rather than to 
noumena (i.e. objects as things-in-themselves, which humans cannot directly 
experience) as the basis for understanding how law works. He believes, in 
other words, that we best grasp the character of law by attending to how it is 
comprehended and treated from the shared horizon or world-view and 
through the mutual adjustments of those whose behaviour is regulated by the 
law.  
It is this phenomenological perspective that lies at the root of his depic-
tion of legal order as involving the specification of the boundaries of behav-
iour in each of spatial, temporal, material and subjective terms. For only by 
including all four spheres of validity of the legal norm – where, when, what 
and who - and by treating them as inextricably connected, he argues, can we 
do full justice to a sense of legal order as it is experienced - as a “concrete or-
der”. (24) And it is just this commitment to a multi-dimensional conception 
of legal order that underpins much of the book’s fresh insight. In particular, 
and of special significance for the study of globalisation and non-state legal 
orders,  that commitment stands behind FLG’s dexterous reconceptualization 
of the frontiers of legal order in terms that go beyond mere territorial borders, 
or even spatial boundaries more generally, so as to embrace all the internal 
“boundaries that join and separate places times, subjects and act-contents 
within the concrete unity of a legal order”(3); and, more broadly, so as to in-
clude the external “limits [that] distinguish [such] a legal order from the do-
main of what remains largely unordered for it.” (3)   
Of this conceptual architecture, and of its relationship to the phenome-
nology of the alien or the strange in the context of law’s response to globalisa-
tion, more in due course, but for now let us remain within the general part of 
legal theory. How does Lindahl’s phenomenological perspective position itself 
in relation to the main schools of legal theory?  The short answer is that he 
stands as a critical witness to much of what we find in our legal theory pri-
mers, but that many of his criticisms are developed en passant as he declines 
to deviate from the pursuit of his own line of inquiry.  For example, positiv-
ism, both in its Kelsenian and in its Hartian variants, is viewed as concerned 
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only or primarily with the unity of the abstract order of norms or rules,  with 
the focus on the internal coherence and systematicity of the legal order in 
question (13-16).  Likewise the  constructivism  of Dworkin, with its exten-
sion of the  furniture of the  normative order to  include not only rules but al-
so principles shaped  by community morality,  and apt to  be measured 
against a thicker standard of integrity. For all the received understanding of 
the Dworkinian canon as locked in deep opposition to positivism, it is treated 
in FLG as just as narrowly focused on internal normative order. (16) Similar-
ly viewed by Lindahl, in its own much more sociologically sensitive way, is 
the systems-theoretical position of Teubner. His idea of legal order as map-
ping  on to a diversity of  functionally specific and self-coded areas of special-
ist regulation, such as  lex constructionis  and  lex digitalis,  in an increasingly 
fragmented world of political authority, assumes a self-regulatory normative 
and institutional  closure that reinforces the autonomy of the relevant epis-
temic or practical community.(58-69) 
 In all these cases, Lindahl wants to re-orient the focus of analysis away 
from the norms themselves and their internal coherence and towards the var-
ious “normative dimensions of behaviour regulated by the law.” (16).   In so do-
ing  he re-introduces into the picture the various ways in which all legal or-
ders, including those national and postnational  legal orders that purport to  
produce complete and gapless normative coverage, or that profess to include 
universal and boundless principles,  as well as the functional legal orders of 
systems theory with their claim to regulate a material practice regardless of 
jurisdictional boundaries, are instead experienced as excluding as much  as in-
cluding, and indeed as  excluding by including and as including by excluding.  
From the perspective of the audience, legal orders of all stripes instead rou-
tinely articulate and impose particular and highly selective jurisdictional lim-
its, including territorial limits, and are often seen or experienced as subject to 
challenge or otherwise interfered with by other phenomenal forms,  including 
the appearance of other normative and legal orders each with their own 
structure of spatial and non-spatial connections and limits.  
A similar picture emerges from Lindahl’s treatment of a catalogue of the-
ories, situated at various points along the communitarian/cosmopolitan con-
tinuum, which is concerned with relationship between the bond of political 
membership and the quality of constitutional authority. (Ch. 7) Whether we 
are dealing with the prior-affinity-based theories of Walzer or Miller, or the 
forward-looking process-based theories of Rawls, Habermas, Young or 
Benhabib, the fly in the ointment, according to FLG,  is “the non-reciprocal 
origins of reciprocity” (234).  The basic factor qualifying the acceptability of 
each theory remains the inevitability of exclusionary limits as understood 
from the standpoint of law’s audience - the arbitrariness of the opening cut 
NEIL WALKER 
 
996 
 
and of the continuing cut-off point in the specification of the community and 
of the material jurisdiction in whose terms legally accredited relations of reci-
procity are cultivated.    
Lindahl’s position as general critic of the field may be radical, but it is al-
so somewhat underspecified. It is radical in the range of its critique. Positiv-
ists and post-positivists alike, cosmopolitans and communitarians alike, pro-
cess-based universalists and ethical particularistic alike, speculative philoso-
phers of law and grounded sociologists of law alike, are all in his view liable to 
neglect, obscure, deny or otherwise discount the arbitrary closure that make 
the very operation of legal order possible, and in so doing they inevitably 
compromise the explanatory power or normative force of their various theses. 
Yet, whether due to Lindahl’s desire not to be distracted by critical side-plots 
in the construction of his own theoretical narrative, or to a more general dis-
taste for academic prize-fighting, he tends not to dwell on his targets. In 
short, he comes to build rather than to conquer. 
 It therefore remains unclear how far he intends to take his reframing of 
the subject.  Few could deny the value of his phenomenological perspective as 
an informative supplement and in some measure also a complement to the 
canon of legal theory. But is that all it is?  Or is  it  intended as more than 
that, as  the first chapter of  what - certainly in the phenomenology-lite, An-
glo-American world of legal scholarship which serves as one important  target 
audience - would be a quite ‘new book’ of legal theory rather than simply the 
latest chapter of the existing  book? If it is not so intended, what further 
sympathetic connections can be made with existing lines of research and 
methodological standpoints? Conversely, if FLG is intended as a fresh start, 
what, if anything, might be lost in the neglect of the ‘noumenal’, or at least, 
in the absence of the kind of heuristic emphasis on the ‘out there’ objectivity 
of certain forces of history or the context-independence of certain candidate 
legal-institutional qualities that we would associate with a less 
phenomenologically focused conception of the social nature of law?  Might 
the Marxist, for example, or the feminist, be frustrated by the relentless con-
text-nuanced emphasis on the phenomenal at the expense of the deep and 
general structural conditions of any possible collective world-view? Or might 
the general theorist of law, whether an ‘essential’ law for all the ages, or at 
least the extended arc of modern state-centred law, feel that something im-
portant in our understanding of the   constancy and resilience of the institu-
tion of law might be lost in an insistent stress on the fluidity of the interface 
between rule production and the various “normative dimensions of behaviour 
regulated by law”?   
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2. The question of generality versus specificity of account has a direct bearing 
on the special part of Hans Lindahl’s thesis. What are the distinctive charac-
teristics of law under those contemporary conditions of the rescaling of many 
forms of economic, cultural and political activity in planetary or otherwise 
expansively transnational terms that trade under the name of globalisation?  
FLG eschews the obvious but, under Lindahl’s theoretical gaze, just as obvi-
ously flawed answer to this question. The territorial border between domestic 
and foreign place that is so central to conventional understandings of state 
law is revealed not as the unique, or even paradigmatic, means of drawing a 
distinction between the legal inside and outside, as is the point of departure of 
so many law and globalisation studies. Rather, it is just one of many ways of 
specifying the boundaries of legal order and the separations and connections 
these boundaries imply. And in a brilliant tour d’horizon of historically, geo-
graphically and functionally diverse forms of normative order from nomad-
ism to the contemporary multinational enterprise, from   lex mercatoria to the 
European Union and the WTO, and from Roman law to the law of cyber-
space, Lindahl applies his conceptualisation of legal order as a concrete, mul-
ti-dimensional accomplishment to demonstrate the fluid boundedness of any 
and all normative systems. (ch.2) 
But, however persuasive his approach, where does Lindahl’s rejection of 
a state-centred template of legal order as the basis for understanding post-
state legal forms leave him in terms of positive explanatory resources? It cer-
tainly allows him to argue, against some strains of state-centred  positivism, 
that bounded legal order remains eminently imaginable even beyond the ter-
ritorial borders of the state, and equally,  against  forms of legal universalism 
with planetary ambitions, that any legal order other than a bounded order 
remains unimaginable even outside the territorial borders of the state (264-
66). Beyond this, however, the emphasis on the permeability and variability  
of  (bounded) legal forms carries a warning that Lindahl may struggle to say 
anything in general about the thrust and shape of law under globalization, 
What  is more,  given his stress on the versatility of legal form as something 
that has subsisted through pre-modern and modern ages, might the threshold 
provision of even the most basic and broadest formula for  distinguishing law 
under conditions of globalisation  from  earlier waves of law pose a difficult 
challenge? 
Certainly, Lindahl the phenomenologist is not so interested in some of the 
more ‘objective’ generalities and regularities that occupy others. He hardly 
concerns himself with the deep historical structure of globalisation or the 
broad pattern of forces beyond our variously collective control, and some-
times even beyond the ken of our conscious imagining, that propels the 
rescaling of our communities of practice and of belonging. But that by no 
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means implies that he lacks insight into the ways in which globalisation 
makes a patterned difference to law, or rather, to how we receive law. In a 
highly suggestive concluding passage in which he draws together his most in-
novative ideas, Lindahl puts forward a view of “globalization as emergent 
intertwinememt” (267). The focus of that approach is upon the entangling of 
home and strange worlds in which law-significant claims emerge that are 
unorderable within the range of practicable possibilities of the home world, 
and to that extent are  neither legal  nor illegal but, in Lindahl’s striking new 
coinage, “a-legal.”(3) It is here, in the realm of incommensurable normative 
claims, that the normative fault-lines of Lindahl’ s title manifest themselves, 
and where what he calls a politics of alegality emerges.  
Lindahl offers a number of examples of how and where alegal political 
spaces appear in a multipolar world. These range from the famous Grogan 
case on abortion information services before the Irish High Court and the 
ECJ, and the equally famous reference before the Canadian Supreme Court 
on Quebec’s claimed right to unilateral secession, to the notorious recent 
Breivik trial in Norway and the much less well-known challenge of the U’wa 
indigenous people before the Colombian Constitution Court against oil drill-
ing activities contiguous to their land (256-260). What these highly disparate 
cases have in common is the articulation of claims from a particular norma-
tive perspective - from a strange place - that are incapable of accommodation 
within the boundaries of the normative system to which they are referred but 
which nevertheless continue to register in their own terms, and which, typi-
cally also elicit some kind of reaction and acknowledgement of their extraor-
dinary nature on the part of the referent system. This reaction, unable to take 
the form of a reduction of what is irreducible to the own-terms of the referent 
system, may instead involve some forms of collective self-restraint, some 
measure of reflexive awareness of the system’s limits and a conscious “hold-
ing back” (255) in the face of finitude. 
In all of this, there is a treasure-trove of insights of which I have offered 
only the merest of glimpses. What remains somewhat underspecified, howev-
er, and what, in conclusion, may be offered as a vital, and  fruitful area of fu-
ture research, is once again how Lindahl’s novel perspective relates and 
should relate to existing lines of inquiry on law under conditions of globalisa-
tion. Two such lines in particular stand out, on both of which LFG offers in-
sightful views.   
On the one hand, the rescaling upwards of political authority, as we have 
already noted, also leads to new types of assertive universalism. What we are 
concerned with here is the claim - monological where the politics of alegality 
are at least primitively dialogical, impervious to system limits where alegality 
connotes a certain collective self-awareness of boundedness - to colonise the 
entire global field of ought-relations within a single normative purview. Per-
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haps most obviously associated with human rights, but also a potent presence 
in areas such as trade law, these are normative orders which do not recognise 
themselves as orders, and, critically, do not recognise themselves as circum-
scribed in the way orders inevitably are. Their point of closure and “blind 
spot”(248) threatens to be just that, not just a necessary presupposition of 
authority without which a limited order cannot come into being, but a form 
of denial that fails to guard against the conceit of order unlimited.  
On the other hand, the rescaling upwards of political authority can also 
lead to new frameworks of what we might call structured pluralism. What we 
are instead concerned with here are the ways in which legal orders in the 
emerging global configuration increasingly ‘open’ themselves to other orders 
of normativity in a more systematic manner than previously.  Taking his cue 
from some of my own work,1 Lindahl discusses how “by means of ‘institu-
tional incorporation’ and ‘system recognition’ a collective institutionalises a 
relation to alterity in the ongoing process of referring to itself as a concrete 
normative unity.” (113)  Paradigmatic examples would include member state  
legal systems’   recognition of the primacy of EU law and the  facilitation of 
that recognition  through the preliminary reference mechanism, or the 
acknowledgement by the Council of Europe members  of the  general authori-
ty of the ECHR and the Strasbourg court in matter of human rights. But be-
yond these well-known cases, we see countless other instances in which con-
temporary legal systems have adjusted their sites so as to receive and trans-
late  normative messages from elsewhere in a way that  “integrates concern 
for the identity” of others  as a normal part of their “practice of collective 
self-identification.” (113) 
Lindahl, to repeat, is far from discounting the significance of these devel-
opments. Intriguingly, indeed, he goes as far to say that it remains “an open 
question whether this [ practice of integration] is the decisive innovation 
which justifies the use of terms such as ‘‘postnationalism’, ‘transnationalism’, 
or ‘denationalization’“. (113) Yet Lindahl seems committed to a broader and 
ultimately more revealing perspective. For his views on pluralism, as also his 
views on universalism, can only be fully grasped if we appreciate their con-
nection and interaction with the type of normative intertwinement he associ-
ates with his central theme of alegality.  
That connection can be understood as significant in both explanatory 
and normative terms. In explanatory terms, alegality is what stands beyond 
the integration of structured pluralism or the repression of assertive univer-
salism. Both pluralism and universalism involve a successful reduction on the 
part of the host order, in the first case one that incorporates the other in the 
                                           
1 See N. Walker “Beyond boundary disputes and basic grids: Mapping the global dis-
order of normative orders”, International Journal of Constitutional Law (2008) 6: 373-396. 
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host’s terms and in the second case, by contrast, one in which the host order 
is simply oblivious to otherness or dismissive of the other. Alegality signals 
the limits to both of these forms of reduction. It represents the middle or in-
between that is no longer excluded when released from the internal binary 
logic of the legal order. It is the sound that is heard as more than mere noise 
but less than legible internal code. It is also the way in which an order is infil-
trated by that which it cannot comprehend or control in ways that neverthe-
less become somehow acknowledged within the order as such. Equally, then, 
just as alegality is what irreducibly remains after and notwithstanding the 
practices of universalism or pluralism, so too it can also recondition these plu-
ralist or universalist regimes, its resistance serving to promote new accommo-
dations and pose new challenges. In a nutshell, the causal connections be-
tween the politics of universalism, pluralism and alegality are dense, fertile 
and multi-directional, each the condition and consequence of the others. 
In normative terms, too, the links are close. What Lindahl offers us is a 
way to go beyond the often rather satisfied pragmatism of structured plural-
ism on the one hand, and either the triumphalism of assertive universalism or 
the negativism that attends its wholesale critique as a normative imperialism 
destined only to serve particular interests in the name of the global good. In-
stead, a politics of alegality, and our awareness of the existence of a space for 
a politics of alegality, can disturb complacency, can check triumphalism, or 
can offer a chink of light that escapes the hegemonic cover.  
Of course, once we begin to develop these various connections we see that 
there is much work that remains to be done. Lindahl’s abstract scheme and 
rich but scattered examples need to be supplemented by a widely drawn legal 
and political sociology prepared to examine in a more systematic fashion the 
kinds of circumstances in which a politics of alegality – of self-restraint and 
resistance in the face of the reductions of law - is more or less likely to chal-
lenge the excesses of universalism or limit the ambitious containments of 
structured pluralism, and how, in particular, economic, institutional and cul-
tural power operate as key variables in all of this. In other words, we do need 
to hear more from the other, ‘objective’ side of social and legal theory. But 
this kind of research agenda, one that promises to give better and rounder 
shape to our critical understanding of how law works and does not work un-
der conditions of globalization, would simply not be possible without the kind 
of intrepid and insightful philosophical framework that Hans Lindahl has 
supplied us. 
 
